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Updating international humanitarian law
and the laws of armed conflict for
the wars of the 21st Century
Gregory Ro se

spects of international humanitarian law (IHL) and
the international law of armed conflict (LOAC )
are out-dated because they are ill-adapted to new
battlefields. Some innovation is needed in them to address
thc complexities of the networked insurgencies that we see
today.
War between states has declined in prev alence and
importance relative to armed conflicts across societal groups,
both within states and acro ss nat ional borders. Private
organisation s are likely to dominate armed conflicts for the
foreseeable future, including those in the Asia- Pacific and
beyond, where Australian expeditiona ry forces are engaged.
Often called 'non-state actors' in the intern ational legal
parlance, they typically conduct hostilities through irregular
but systematic attacks, including bombings , shootings and
psychological operations. Are these armed conflicts to which
LOAC even applies?
The asymmetrical balance of forces resulting from the
confrontation between states and non-state actors leads
typically to tactics by the latter tha t include violence
intentionally directed against soft targets such as civilians.
These tactics can be defined as war crimes or terrori sm,
although application of each of these categories is legally
controversial. The crimina lity of the tactics used raises the
need for mechanisms for prosecution of these crimes. Such
mechanisms need to be applicable across a wide runge of
novel armed conflict circumstances and be sufficiently robust
to withstand intensely political scrutiny of their legitimacy.
In addition, the privatisation of American mi litar y
operations in Iraq has been extraordinaril y extensive and
responses to allegations made against the conduct ofprivate
security corporation s have demonstrated that the framework
for their accountability is poorly developed. To whom are
they liable and should they be covered under status-of-forces
agreements as military auxiliaries? Under what circumstances
might they be regarded as mercenarie s?

A

Confronting sacred taboos
Both IHL and LOAC naturally reflect what we have
learned from the wars of the past. The fr esh lessons
of the World War 11 mot ivated a rewrite and further
development of international law, producin g the four 1949
Geneva conventions. The mid-20'h-century experience of

decolonisation led to the two 1977 Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions.

Although those treaties and protoco ls are partly based
on enduring moral principles, they are also partly based
on international pol itical processes. Such processes are
reflective of their contemporary attitudes and circum stances
and often articulate fractiou s compr omises . Thus, it should
not be surprising to find that the Geneva convention s and
protoco ls are not fully attuned to the early 21st Century, just
as they could not reasonably be expected to anticipate all the
exigencies of the 22nd Century.
Yet, the new dilemmas of 21st Century war have been
pressing upon legal policy makers with increasing urgency for
over a decade without being addressed. The extraord inarily
important function of IHL and LOAC in civilising armed
co nflict has attained a sacred status. The curre nt treaty
instruments have themselve s become a holy canon. The
suggestion that aspects ofthem might be inappropriate or illadapted to 21st Century asymmetrical conflict, and that they
need rethinking, attracts consternation and opprobrium among
many expert practitio ners. The International Committee of
the Red Cross has stated its position firmly; it sees no need
to revisit the Geneva Convent ions and Protocols .

New conflicts - new moral and
legal dilemmas
Nevertheless, there are endless debates and confusion on
many matters to be found in newspapers, acade mic journals
and legal and defence circles. These include deciding
whether particular insurgents are or are not terrorists; when
are insurgents to be regarded as combatants and if, when
and how might they retain civilian status; what rights and
protections are they entitled to, and what might the rights
and obligations of state powers be. Such practica l and legal
quandari es demonstrate the uncert ainty generated by the
ambiguities and anachroni sms in the Geneva Convent ions
and Protocols. Guantanamo Bay has aptly been called a legal
black hole. The so-called 'War on Terrorism ' gives these
problems profile and urgency.
At the heart of today 's doubts, needs, iniqui tie s and
questions are the problems caused by changing battlefield
practices. These include asymmetry offorces, non-distinction .IIIIIIIIl
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between co mba tants and civilians (especially by te rrorists)
and the privatisation or civilianisation by contrac t ofmilitary
support structures and prot ecti ve security eleme nts. These are
exacerba ted by a funda mental lack of reci procity between
belli geren t parties, es pec ia lly na tion -stat es bou nd by and
adheri ng to IH L and LOAC, and their terrorist adve rsaries
who do not fee l so bo und and who often regard the adherence
by others to IHLand LOAC as an advantage to be rut hless ly
exploited.
Contemporary hosti lit ies led by non-state actors also
are frequently 'internationalised' in that they benefit from
support by foreign governments, whether by means ofarms,
intelligence, finance or refuge. Thus, they are trans-na tional
conflicts that are ne tworked across several co untries but
do not occ ur d irectly between co untries. Debate over the
meani ng of Common A rticle 3 of the Ge neva Conventio ns,
w hich applies to ar me d co nflict of a ' non-in ternational
character', has ce ntre d on whether it pro perly applies only
to intern al or also to trans- national confl icts. A plurality of
the United States Supreme Co urt conside red it to be bro ad
enough to cover the circ umstances of tra ns-nationa l armed
co nflict with private organisations (Hamdan v Ru msfe ld).
However, Co mmo n A rticl e 3 is art iculated in h ighl y
genera lised terms and provides scant legal guidance for state
conduct in address ing the wide va riety of circumstances that
need to be covered. Common Article 3 may be suppleme nted
by Article 75 of Additional Protoc ol I and by Add itiona l
Protoco l II , to the ex te nt that those pro visions have becom e
customary intern ational law, w hich is uncertai n, o r to the
extent that those instru ments have bee n ratified (eg. Austra lia
has rat ified both, the USA has not).
Jus t as the times change and history moves on, so must the
law. We need to rev iew as pects of the Gen eva co nventions
an d thei r Protocols, discomfort ing a task as it may be, so
as to enable and enforce the rule of law in armed conflict.
To address contempo rary battlefie ld rea lity, new questions
need to be elaborated in international law. T hese primarily
concern the respective status , rights an d responsib ilities of

statepowers vis-a-vis private actorsthatare notconventional
armed forces, such as insurgents and security corporations.
v

Keeping up with national laws
National legal systems have been far more quick and
ag ile in confronting the new challenges posed by networked
insu rgents us ing terrorist tac tics. A us tra lia, for example,
like Canada, Fra nce, the United Kingdom and the USA,
has instituted new laws tha t define and crim ina lise terrorist
networks, rede fine an d mo de rnise the definition of sed ition,
exte nd the extra territorial application ofthese crimes, expand
intelligence ga thering powers and pro tec t intellige nce fro m
disclosure, enab le eme rgency preven tat ive det enti on, create
contro l orders to restr ict liberty of movement, res tra in some
usual privileges in co urt ca ses, and facilitate the mobi lisation
of m ilitary forces to assi st the pol ice with dom esti c law

enforcement.
Th ese new nation al se cur ity laws are fo rg ing a new
legal space between the domestic laws govern ing cr iminal
..... proced ure a nd thos e g ove rni ng intern a tio nal ar me d
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co nflict. Complementary inn ovation is needed in the more
cumbersom e international lega l sys te m .
Some ha ve suggested that human rights trea ties provide
guidance for IH L an d LOAC. On the o ne hand, it is arguable
that the Geneva Co nven tions form a special law (lex specialisi
that d isplaces the application of human rights norm s, such as
the right to life, in the cir cumstances of arme d confl ict. On
the other hand, the position articulated by United Natio ns
bodies, including the bench of the International Court of
Justice, opine for the complementary application of human
rights norms but do not prescribe wh ich or how these are to
be implemented during hostilities. Further, it is uncertain
which human rights norms might be considered customary
international law and not all states are bound by all the

relevant provisions.
Sign ifica ntly, in Decembe r 2007 the UK House of Lords
decided that a person 's huma n rig hts may be in fring ed
law full y in legit im ate mil ita ry operatio ns w he re it is
necessary for imperat ive reasons of sec urity, but that the
human rights co ncerned are me re ly qualified to th e ex tent
necessary, no t displaced. (T he case was decided in relation to
mili tary operations by the Un ited Kingdo m in Iraq authori sed
by the Unit ed Nations Sec ur ity Co unc il, and hu man rig hts
norm s binding on the United Kin gd om under th e European
Co nvention on Human R ights iA l-Jeddo v Secretary of
Defe nce )). How ever, the exten t to w hich it is necessary to
qualify the application of human rights norms duri ng arme d
co nflict remains unclear. There rema ins an immediate need
to ela borate adequate legal standa rds applica ble to no n-sta te
actors engaged in ho sti lities.

New protocol for a new age of
warfare
A Fourth Protocol to the Geneva Co nve ntions wou ld be
useful. It could fill troub ling gaps in the Conventions, an d
fix some of the problems of the First Protocol. In particular,
it m ight clarify in what circumstances targeted atta cks on

insurgents who use terrorist tactics are to be characterised
as combat measures in an armed conflict or as extrajudicial
assassinations within statejurisdiction.
A Fourth Protocol might also address some particu larly
vexing dilemmas arising fro m recent intern ati on al armed
co nflicts :
• W hat is th e le gal s ig n ifica nce of t ran s- n at iona l
circumstances in a confl ict w ith pr ivate (no n-s tate)
actors?
• Wh en captur ed alive, how are private actors to be treated,
especially iflon g-term det enti on of terror ist belligerents
is invo lved to prevent them rene wing their bellige renc y
(as it is fo r pr ison ers-of- war under the T hird G enev a
Co nv ention)?
• When and how are such detained non -state actors to be
released?
• What is th e consequence of their non- enemy natio nality,
parti cularly if th e armed co nflict in qu estion is a transnational but not an inter-state one?

• What is the proper method of trial for their crim es against
IHL?
• Which of the obligations of a sta te power are unilateral
and which reciprocal?
• In what circums tance s are the personnel of a contract ed
private security company entitled to civilian protections
or to be treated as combatants?
• What obligations do they owe to whom?
• In cases of negligence or of crimina l conduct, to who m
are they liable?
• By wha t process sho uld they be held acco untable?
The USA has been the main country to begin formulat ing
a set of intern ationally applicable rules that respond to the
new circumstances of armed conflict. Its efforts to devise a
trial system by military commission have fumbled thro ugh a
thicket of domestic and internat iona l objecti ons. Actions of
the USA in the Middle East, and in Guantanamo Bay, as we ll
as the practice of extraordin ary rendition in Central Europe
and Central As ia, have caused controversy. Allegations
concerning war crimes by the USA and its allies thrive
in the current uncerta inty concerning the app licati on of
the laws of armed confl ict to trans-national terrori sm and
insurgency. That the US's terro rist adversaries resolutely
refuse to comply with IHL in their exec ution of atta cks is
too often ignored or glossed ove r in international discussions
of the legal frameworks invo lved. Highly politicised war
crimes indictments against other political figures and mi litary
personn el also have been launched in countrie s including
Belgium, France, New Zea land and the UK.
Measures taken by the United States administrat ion and
courts include:
• de fin ing a cl ass of co mbata nts not en ti tle d to the
prot ections of the Third Geneva Convention;
• definin g the responsibi lities of the deta ining power under
Commo n Article 3 of all four Geneva Convention;
• de fini ng armed confl ict by them, whe re it involves
terrorism, as a crime; and
• devising a trial syste m by military co mmission for those
to be charged with war crimes, crimes agai nst the laws
of wa r or serious criminal offences.

Moral as well as legal obligation
In December 2007, the LegalAdvi ser to the US Secretary
of Stat e, John B. Be llinger III, in an address at Ox ford
University, called for scholarly debate to clarify and elaborate
the rule of law in relation to detentions of private persons
engaged in trans-national terrori st ac tivities. Sim ilarly, the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Com mons in
the United Kingdom has called for updating of the Ge neva
Conventions. Furthe r research and conceptua l work is also
needed to elaborate rules for the civil and crimina l liabil ity
of private security cor porations that a state contracts to
provide services in the fie ld. The process of intern ational
law forma tion is diffuse and the time is ripe to deepen and
widen the discourse on this topic.

Unfo rtuna tely, there has been little di scourse yet in
academi a on how new lega l initi atives might clarify and
elaborate the status of non-state actors . While the political
sen sit ivit y of these iss ues might be expecte d to inh ibit
governme ntal leadership in a divisive global debate over
innovative standards, it is conce rn ing that acad emic debate
has also been sparse. Ofcourse, the same political sensibilities
and reticence predom inate in acade me but it is remark able
that, over seven years after the I I September 200 I attacks
and the launch of the 'war on terrorism', the issues remain
to be syste matically explored.
Austral ia has much to contribute in this field and a timely
opp ortu nity to do so. It is appropriate that Australia, as a
member of the ' coalition of the willing' in Iraq, the NATOled Internationa l Sec urity Assistance Force in A fghanistan
and the International Security Force in East Timor, consider
its di rect an d reg io na l interes ts in the deve lopment of
norms related to insurgents and pr ivate military com panies .
Throughout As ia, state military and police forces are also
both be ing engage d to co mbat the overlapping phenome na
of network ed insurgency and tran snat iona l crime.
Although the USA has gone it alone to create a legal
system to addre ss its tra ns-natio na l armed conflict w ith
private parti es, other insurge nts or terrori sts and other states
are engag ed in com parable conflicts. The examples of anned
conflicts with insurge nt groups in India, Indonesia, Paki stan,
the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand come readily to mind .
The time has come for interna tiona l lawyers in government
and acad emia to upd ate the intern ational laws of ar med
conflict. Although it is eas ier to sit back and watch the USA
shoulder the responsibility oflegal innovation, and the risk
of opprobrium for blaspheming apparent holy canon, that
path w ill not lead to an optimal outcome for Au stralian and
other national interests.
It will instea d res ult in the much slower development of
new customary legal practices, greater uncertainty as to what
they are, and a lesser role for ot her interested countries in
crafting outcomes that are appropriate to their specific need s
and capabilities. And it is cow ardly to leave such matters up
to the Am eric ans.
If Australian forces in Afghanistan ca pture in battle a
private co mbatant who is a citizen of a friend ly count ry, say
Noordin Mohammed Top, how should we treat him and under
what law? Nex t time an Austra lian ally captures a new David
Hicks on a new ba ttlefield, what shou ld we expect? Unless
we are willing to devise a clearer internationa l law for such
situations, we can have no fair expectations.•
Asso ciate Professor Greg ory Rose teaches international
crimina l law in the Faculty of La w at the University of

Wollongo ng. This article has been p eer-reviewed bef ore
publication.
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